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Abstract: 
Using street level crime data for London from December 2010 to March 2012 merged with 
detailed information on crimes committed during the 2011 London riots, I show that crime in 
areas affected by the riots fell considerably in the months following the riots. I also 
investigate two potentials channels through which the riots might have influenced future 
crime rates, specifically unemployment and changes in police deployment. The results 
suggest increases in unemployment in the affected areas and no change in police deployment 
in the months after the riots, suggesting that crime fell for other reasons. 
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1. Introduction 
Riots are a recurring phenomenon in many societies. With the exception of one study on the 
consequences of riots in the US in the 1960 for property values (Collins and Margo, 2007) 
and one study on the economic impact of the Rodney King riots (Matheson and Baade, 
2004), the (sparse) economic literature has primarily focused on their determinants (see, e.g., 
DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1998). In contrast, this paper focuses on the consequences of the 
2011 London riots for subsequent criminal behaviour. These riots (and their extension to 
other cities) were some of the worst riots in (younger) British history. Following the shooting 
of a local man by the police on August 4, riots broke out in Tottenham, a part of London. The 
riots lasted from August 6 to August 10 and led to frequent looting, arson and rioting in 
several boroughs in London as well as in Birmingham, Bristol, Manchester, Liverpool and 
several smaller towns.  
There is a range of reasons why we might expect to see an impact of riots on crime in 
subsequent months. First, a range of papers has considered the importance of spillovers 
between individuals for the level of criminal activity. Such spillovers might occur, for 
instance, because individuals’ perceptions of detection probabilities are interdependent (Sah, 
1991). Another possibility is that actual detection probabilities depend on the overall level of 
criminal activity such that each individual that engages in crime lowers detection 
probabilities for everyone else (e.g., Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, p. 409; Tabarrok, 
1997). Note that these effects might also lower future crime rates if, e.g., potential criminals 
in areas affected by the riots expect a higher level of policing in the foreseeable future and 
thus refrain from criminal activities.  
The general idea that such spillovers matter has also been tested in a range of papers: Case 
and Katz (1991) find some evidence that social interactions between youths and their parents 
and between then and their peers matter for the youths’ propensity to engage in criminal 
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behaviour. Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) build and test a model where 
individual decisions about criminal activities are influenced by their neighbours’ decisions. 
Their findings suggest that social interactions play a major role in larceny and auto-theft and 
a smaller but still large role in assault, burglary, and robbery, while they do net seem to 
matter much for arson, murder and rape. They also find larger effects for crimes committed 
by younger individuals and in areas with fewer intact families. Further empirical evidence on 
peer effects in crime was found by Bayer, Pintoff and Pozen (2009) if a study of incarcerated 
juveniles in Florida. Their findings suggest that exposure to other prisoners who have a 
history in the same offence as the respective individual tends to increase the likelihood of 
recidivism in the same offence category. Particular strong effects were found for burglary, 
petty larceny, felony and misdemeanor drug offenses, aggravated assault, and felony sex 
offenses.  
A second link between riots and crime is directly tied to economic conditions. There is 
evidence that firms base their location decisions at least partially on local crime rates (e.g., 
Cullen and Levitt, 1999; Abadie and Dermisi, 2008; Rosenthal and Ross, 2010) and there is a 
well established link between economic conditions and crime as predicted by the standard 
Becker model of crime (Becker, 1968; Piehl, 1998; Freeman, 1999). If businesses decide to 
relocate because of the riots or if businesses are forced to close due to the destruction of their 
property, areas affected by the riots might be expected to decline economically, which in turn 
might drive up crime rates. 
A third link could occur due to deterrence through penalties handed out after the riots. 
Punishments after the riots were frequently criticised as being too severe (e.g., Baggini, 
2011). An eventual deterrence effect could be larger in the affected areas, if, for instance, 
people in these areas experience more closely due to their friends and acquaintances being 
sent to prison.  
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Finally, if contemporaneous and future crimes are substitutes, we might expect the riots to 
actually lower future criminal activity. A substitutional relationship could arise, for instance, 
if individuals occasionally need to “let of steam”1, in which case rioting might prevent future 
acts of disorder, or if individuals just steal enough to get by for some time, in which case theft 
now would lead to less theft in the future. 
I use street-level crime data for the period December 2010 to March 2012 from 
www.police.uk – aggregated at the level of 8 digit postcodes, roughly equivalent to streets or 
parts of streets – and a full list of all riot-related incidents including their location that was 
compiled by the British newspaper The Guardian (see Rogers and Sedghi, 2011). 
Identification is based on the fact that the 2011 London riots suddenly and unexpectedly 
increased crime in some areas in London. Importantly, while the riots happened in some of 
the more crime ridden areas of London, the event that triggered the riots – the shooting of 
Mark Duggan by the police on August 4, 2011 and the subsequent behaviour of police 
officials in the face of early peaceful anti-police protest – are unrelated to any criminal 
activities in both the affected and unaffected areas of London. I then use difference-in-
differences estimators to look at changes in total crime, violent crime, non-violent crime and 
anti-social behaviour2 in directly and indirectly affected areas relative to unaffected areas. 
Furthermore, I investigate two channels through which the riots might have influenced crime 
rates. First, I look at the effects of the riots on local unemployment as a proxy for changes in 
the economic conditions in the affected areas using low-level unemployment data for lower 
layer super output areas from official labour market statistics. In a second step, I consider 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Some qualitative interviews after the riots suggest that participants were at least partially 
motivated by this desire (see The Guardian, 2011). 
2 The notion of “anti-social behaviour” was introduced in the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act 
with some changes being introduced in the 2003 Anti-social Behaviour Act. It basically 
describes acting “in a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress 
to one or more persons not of the same household as himself [the perpetrator]” (Part I, 
Chapter 1, Section 1 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998). 
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changes in police deployment using ward and borough level data obtained from the 
Metropolitan Police Service.  
My results indicate that  
(a) the riots seem to have decreased violent crime and anti-social behaviour in directly 
affected areas in the months following August 2011, 
(b) the riots seem to have decreased all types of crime in areas that are spatially close to 
affected areas, but that were themselves unaffected,  
(c) most of these effects are relatively small relative to mean number of crimes and their 
standard deviation, however, they are comparatively large when it comes to the actual 
number of crimes,  
(d) unemployment numbers increased in the directly and indirectly affected areas, and  
(e) police deployment increased heavily across London during August 2011, i.e., during 
the riots, but not so much in the following months.  
Validation checks indicate that  
(a) affected and unaffected postcodes had very similar crime trends in the period 
December 2010 to July 2011, i.e., the month before the riots, 
(b) no effects or effects that go in an opposite direction to the main estimates are found 
when artificially moving the treatment date to either February or May 2011, and  
(c)  results are unaffected by restricting the sample to postcode areas (larger aggregations 
of postcodes) that contain at least one affected postcode. 
Back of the envelope calculations based on the main estimates suggests that directly affected 
areas experienced around 600 fewer violent crimes and 2,400 fewer cases of anti-social 
behaviour from September 2011 to March 2012 than they would have experienced in the 
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absence of the riots. These numbers are even larger for indirectly affected districts, which 
experienced around 3,500 fewer cases of non-violent crime, 1,500 fewer cases of non-violent 
crime and 4,800 fewer cases of anti-social behaviour. Given the results on unemployment and 
police deployment, it seems unlikely that these decreases can be explained by changes in the 
economic conditions or through reactions by the police. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides background on the 
London riots; section 3 introduces the data. The empirical approach is outlined in section 4 
along with some evidence on its validity. Section 5 presents the main results. Some 
robustness checks are found in section 6, while section 7 concludes. 
2. Background: The 2011 London riots3 
On August 4, 2011, police investigating gun crimes shoot the 29-year old Mark Duggan in 
Tottenham, London, allegedly after he fired his gun at them. During the next couple of days 
tensions in the community built over these claims (which were found to be false on August 9 
following an investigation by the Independent Police Complaints Commission, see Vasagar, 
2011) and an alleged failing of communication by the police (Lewis, Laville and Davies, 
2011). During the late afternoon on August 6, a crowd of protesters marched from 
Broadwater Farm to Tottenham police station. After several hours of waiting for senior police 
officials to talk to them, riots broke out at dawn when rumours of a female protester being 
beaten by policemen started to spread (Lewis, 2011). During the following night, several 
police cars, a bus and several shops in Tottenham, Tottenham Hale and Wood Green were 
attacked, looted and set ablaze (Bolesworth et al., 2011). During the night, police had a hard 
time regaining control and it took several hours before fire engines were able to reach some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Full timelines of the riots can be found at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8691578/London-riots-timeline-of-
violence.html and http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/interactive/2011/sep/05/england-riots-
timeline-interactive. 
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of the burning buildings (Lewis, 2011). The following day police enforcements from Thames 
Valley, Essex, Surrey and Kent were brought to London. Nevertheless, on the evening of 
August 7, the riots spread to Enfield and Brixton and in the early morning of the August 8 
also to Walthamstow and Hackney. In all these areas high street shops were targeted and 
looted, often by groups of people.4 On the evening and night of August 8/9, riots were 
reported from Camden, Clapham, Ealing, Hackney, Peckham and Woolwich in London. 
Furthermore, there were incidents in Birmingham, Bristol and Liverpool, including looting 
and arson. Later on August 9, riots in London had essentially stopped, however, on the 
evening of that day incidents were again reported in Birmingham, Gloucester, Liverpool and 
Manchester.  
In total, the riots led to 5,112 recorded crimes across England of which 3,461 occurred in 
London alone (Home Office, 2011). Five people were killed during the riots and several 
hundred injured. The Association of British Insurers expect to pay out around £200 million in 
damages (Association of British Insurers, 2012) with some estimates even suggesting £300 
million (Dodd, 2011), not counting the costs of policing and losses through earlier closures or 
lower business activities for some firms in the affected areas. Further information and 
analysis on the riots can be found in The Guardian (2011) and Riots Communities and 
Victims Panel (2012). 
 
3. Data 
The crime data originates from www.police.uk, a website operated by the British police 
forces that provides street-level monthly crime maps and also allows access to the underlying 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 A detailed coverage of these events can be found at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/blog/2011/aug/07/tottenham-riots-police-duggan-live.  
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raw data. I use data for the Metropolitan Police and the City of London Police. The data 
record the type of the incident using 12 categories, specifically “Anti-social behaviour”, 
“Burglary”, “Criminal damage and Arson”, “Drugs”, “Other Theft”, “Other crime”, “Public 
Disorder and Weapons”, “Robbery”, “Shoplifting”, “Vehicle crime” and “Violent crime”. 
Unfortunately, “Criminal damage and Arson”, “Drugs”, “Other Theft”, “Public Disorder and 
Weapons” and “Shoplifting” are only recorded as separate categories from August 2011 
onwards. This fact also leads to a structural break in the “Other crime” category, where these 
crimes were previously recorded. To overcome this problem, I will generally look at 
aggregates of these categories, specifically “Total crime” (the sum of all the of above except 
for anti-social behaviour), “Non-violent crime” (the sum of all of the above except for anti-
social behaviour and violent crime), “Violent crime” and “Anti-social behaviour”. 
The data also contain the exact location of each incident, given by Easting/Northing-
coordinates. These were used to match each crime to the nearest UK 8-digit postcode.5 These 
usually correspond to either a street or parts of a street. In a second step, the data were 
collapsed to counts on the month-postcode level.  
Data on the riots is taken from a list of all verified riot-related incidents compiled by the 
British newspaper The Guardian (see Rogers and Sedghi, 2011). The list contains a 
description of the event as well as the time and location. In most cases postcode information 
was available for each incident, otherwise latitude and longitude coordinates were given 
instead. For the latter, google maps was used to find the corresponding postcodes. Note that 
this paper uses only the riot-related events that took place in London. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Specifically, coordinates were first converted to latitude and longitude and then matched to 
the closest postcode based on the geodetic distance between the coordinates. All distance 
calculations in this paper use the ado-files geonear and geodist by Robert Picard. 
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Subsequently, postcodes were sorted into the following three groups: Directly affected 
postcodes are all postcodes that are in the same postcode sector as a reported riot-related 
incident. Postcode sectors are larger aggregations of postcodes that are regionally close to 
each other. In total, there are about 10,600 postcode sectors in the UK, of which 1,081 are 
found in the data used here. This higher level of aggregation is somewhat more sensible than 
single postcodes as the riots can be expected to affect more people than just those in the 
immediate vicinity of an incident, be it because larger areas become stigmatised by the 
rioting or be it because people from a somewhat larger area participated in the rioting. I also 
consider a second treatment group, specifically indirectly affected postcodes. These are in the 
same postcode district, but not in the same postcode sector as a riot-related incident. Postcode 
districts are again larger aggregations of postcode sectors. There are approximately 2,800 of 
them in the UK. Postcodes that are considered to be unaffected by the riots are those that are 
in postcode districts without any reported incident. This split basically gives three groups that 
are increasingly far away from any riot-related incident. 
In total my estimation sample contains 13,215 directly affected postcodes with 211,440 
observations, 32,110 indirectly affected postcodes with 513,760 observations and 161,685 
unaffected postcodes with 2,586,960 observations. Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for 
these groups. 
(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.) 
4. Empirical approach 
I rely on a difference-in-differences approach with two treatment groups – directly and 
indirectly affected areas – and one control group – unaffected areas. Specifically, I estimate 
!!"# = !! + !! ∗ !!" + !! ∗ !!"# +!!!!!!!! !!" !!" ∗ !!"# + !!"#!!!!!!!!   (1) 
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where !!"# is the number of crimes in postcode i (nested within postcode sector j) in month t, !! are postcode fixed effects, D contains two dummies marking directly and indirectly 
affected  areas, T contains four dummies for various post-treatment periods, specifically 
August 2011 (the month of the riots), September 2011, October to December 2011 and 
January to March 2012. The parameters of interest are contained in !!", which measure the 
difference in crime numbers between treatment and control groups in the four post-treatment 
periods. Note that the !! are not identified as treatment group definitions are time-invariant 
and hence absorbed in the postcode fixed effects. The interactions of the treatment group 
dummies with time, however, are identified. As treatment group definitions vary only on the 
postcode sector level all standard errors are adjusted for clustering on that level.  
The central assumption for the interpretation of !!" as the causal effect of the riots is that 
affected and unaffected areas would have experienced the same trends had the riots not 
happened. This assumption is fundamentally untestable, however, the following will show 
graphical and econometric evidence suggesting that trends in treatment and control groups 
were similar in the pre-treatment period. 
(FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE.) 
Figure 1 presents evidence on the evolution of crime numbers from December 2010 to March 
2012. The first thing to note is that areas that were directly or indirectly affected by the riots 
generally experienced more crime than unaffected regions. This is consistent with the 
observation that the riots started in some of the more deprived and crime-ridden areas in 
London.  
Second, the general trend in crime in the period prior to August 2011, i.e., the time of the 
riots, appears to be broadly similar across the three types of areas, which is reassuring for the 
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use of difference-in-differences estimators. We will see later that this result is also confirmed 
using two pseudo-interventions. 
A third thing to note is that crime rates do not seem to increase by as much as one might 
expect during the riots. This fact was also noticed by the British press and initially raised 
suspicion regarding the accuracy of the reported numbers (e.g., Brown, 2011; Doyle 2011). 
One reason for this apparent oddity is the very low spatial aggregation used here, which 
means that even 5,000 additional crimes will not increase the average crime number in every 
postcode by that much. A second reason for this fact – as was explained by police 
spokespersons at that time (Brown, 2011; Doyle 2011) –is related to Home Office recording 
rules: Under these, a crime, say breaking into a shop and looting it, will count as one crime in 
the statistics regardless of whether it was committed by one or a hundred people. This will 
inevitably lead to (perceived) undercounting of criminal activity during the riots where 
crimes were often committed by large groups of individuals.  
(TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE.) 
Table 2 presents results from two pseudo-interventions where the “riots” were artificially 
moved to March and May 2011 respectively and the sample was restricted to the pre-
treatment period. If the common trend assumption is valid, one can expect to see small and 
insignificant coefficients for the interaction term defined using the pseudo-treatment. As table 
2 shows this appears to be the case for directly affected areas, while the indirectly affected 
areas appear to have somewhat more strongly rising crime numbers than the unaffected areas. 
This fact can be expected to lead to an upward bias in the main estimates, however, we will 
see in the coming section that this would actually bias the results against finding an impact of 
the riots in this case. 
5. Results 
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A. Base results 
Table 3 presents the base estimates. Before turning to the parameters of interest note briefly 
that crime falls all across London in the months after the riots. During the riots, we observe 
relative increases in criminal activities, specifically in total crime, non-violent crime and anti-
social behaviour, in the directly affected areas. This finding is obviously not surprising and a 
direct result of the riots. At the same time, crime – with the exception of anti-social behaviour 
– seems to decrease in unaffected and indirectly affected areas.  
 (TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE.) 
More interesting are the changes in the affected areas in the months following the riots. Note 
first that all point estimates of the treatment effects, regardless of significance, are negative, 
indicating a decrease in crime. In the directly affected areas we observe significant negative 
declines in violent crime and anti-social behaviour from September 2011 onwards. In the 
indirectly affected areas, crime seems to decrease across the board.  
An interesting question is whether these effects are (economically) large. Point estimates are 
usually in the magnitude of between -0.003 and -0.03, which seems relatively small 
compared with mean numbers of crime that depending on the type of crime, range from 0.05 
to 0.53, and standard deviations that are between 0.3 and 3.7. However, it needs to be kept in 
mind that these are average changes in crime numbers for relatively small spatial units. 
Consequently, it might be more illustrative to consider the total change in crime numbers 
over all affected districts. To arrive at that number, remember that the coefficients, τ, in table 
3 give us the average change in crimes per month per postcode. To arrive at the change in the 
total number of crimes we can simply multiply this number by the number of postcodes, i.e., 
the cross-sectional units, in each group. The change in crimes per month can then be 
expressed by τ * 13,215 for directly affected postcodes wand by τ * 32,110 for indirectly 
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affected postcode. In the period covering more than one month, this number then needs to be 
multiplied by the number of months as well.  
(TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE.) 
Table 4 presents results from these back-of-the-envelope calculations. Non-significant 
coefficients have been set to zero for this exercise, which implies that the estimated numbers 
are lower bounds. The results suggest that directly affected areas experienced a total of 572 
fewer violent crimes and 2,391 fewer acts of anti-social behaviour because of the riots. For 
indirectly affected areas the effects are even stronger with 3,526 fewer non-violent and 1,477 
fewer violent crimes and 4,849 fewer acts of anti-social behaviour. Compared with an 
estimated 3,461 riot-related crimes that were reported in London (Home Office, 2011), these 
numbers appear to be quite substantial although not unreasonably large. 
B. Dropping unaffected postcode areas 
A potential concern with the estimates in the previous section is that several postcode areas in 
Greater London, in particular those outside of the London postal district, did not report a 
single riot-related incident. Specifically, these were DA (Dartford), HA (Harrow), KT 
(Kingston upon Thames), SM (Sutton), TW (Twickenham), UB (Uxbridge) and WC 
(Western Central). As many of these are also further away from London’s inner city, one 
might suspect that these are bad control units for affected inner city districts. To address these 
potential concerns, table 5 reports estimates based on equation (1), but on a reduced sample 
excluding these areas. 
(TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE.) 
The results are basically identical to those in table 3. If anything the results seem to become 
stronger with several (negative) coefficients gaining in magnitude and some being pushed to 
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statistical significance. However, the qualitative picture remains essentially identical with all 
estimates pointing towards reductions in crime after the riots. 
6. Additional analysis 
A. Unemployment estimates 
One channel through which the riots and crime rates could be interlinked is the local 
economy. The riots had an adverse effect on various local businesses, including several stores 
that were destroyed, which should lower local employment opportunities. We might also 
imagine an additional effect on local employment if firms decide to locate to other areas of 
London (see, e.g., Cullen and Levitt, 1999; Abadie and Dermisi, 2008; and Rosenthal and 
Ross, 2010, for investigations of the link between crime and firms location decisions) 
Furthermore, it seems possible that the riots led to some stigmatisation of individuals from 
those areas in the labour market, which should also lower labour market prospects for people 
from the affected areas. The standard Becker model of crime (Becker, 1968; Piehl, 1998; 
Freeman, 1999) would then suggest that a decrease in legal employment opportunities should, 
ceteris paribus, increase crime.  
The lowest spatial aggregation at which some information on economic conditions, 
specifically the number of individuals claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), the basic 
unemployment benefit in the UK, is available are lower layer super output areas (LSOAs). 
These are spatial units used by the UK census to present data in a consistent way over time. 
LSOAs are relatively small spatial units with a population of on average 1600 inhabitants 
according to the Small Area Population Estimates by the Office for National Statistics. 
London has 5,581 LSOAs of which 69 were directly and 314 indirectly affected by the riots. 
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The data on JSA claimants was obtained from http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/, which provides 
official labour market statistics for the UK. The available data contains information on all 
JSA claimants, JSA claimants below 18 and 25 years of age and JSA claimants who have 
been unemployed for than 6 months and more than 1 year. Table 6 provides descriptive 
statistics. 
 (TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE.) 
Difference-in-differences estimates can be found in table 7. They suggest that the number of 
all claimants and claimants who have been unemployed for more than 6 months or more than 
1 year indeed increased in both the directly and indirectly affected areas. The effects are 
relatively large relative to the means displayed in table 6 and are again stronger, both in terms 
of effect size and statistical significance, in the indirectly affected areas. However, one should 
keep in mind that the effective sample size for the directly affected areas is comparatively 
small, which might explain the lack of significance. The effects also seem to become stronger 
the more time has passed since the riots, which is in line with a sluggish adjustment of labour 
in the affected firms.  
(TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE.) 
In terms of explaining the observed drop in crime rates, however, results suggesting an 
increase in unemployment seem puzzling, at least a first glance. However, the strongest 
positive link between unemployment and crime is generally found for property crime, while 
the evidence on violent crime is generally more inconclusive (e.g., Carmichael and Ward, 
2001; Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Gould, Weinberg and Mustard, 2002; Braakmann, 
2012). In fact, the two available studies for England (Carmichael and Ward, 2001; 
Braakmann, 2012) both find some evidence for a negative correlation between regional 
unemployment and regional violent crime. Braakmann (2012) also finds evidence for a 
 16 
negative correlation between (youth) unemployment and anti-social behaviour. In light of 
these findings, it seems possible that the decrease in violent crime rates observed in the 
previous section might indeed be related to the increase in unemployment. 
B. Policing 
A further potential reason for the drop in crime observed in the months after the riots is a 
reaction by the police. If, e.g., police presence was increased in the affected areas or if the 
police put in greater effort due to greater public scrutiny, we would expect this to decrease 
crime rates either due to greater deterrence or simply because more criminals get caught.  
To shed some light on this question, police deployment data was obtained from the 
Metropolitan Police Service. There are two measures of police deployment available: The 
first is ward-level information on the hours on duty by safer neighbourhood team officers, the 
second is borough-level information on potential hours on patrol by all police officers in the 
respective borough. The former is available for a total of 620 cross-sectional observations, of 
which 581 are observed for the whole period from December 2010 to March 2012. Table 8 
presents descriptive statistics. Note that there is wide variation in particular in the ward-level 
data. The (very low) minimum of 7 hours comes from Lesnes Abbey ward in Bexley, which 
has correspondingly low number of hours on duty in other months. The maximum is reached 
by Shepherds Bush Green in Hamersmith and Fulham during August 2011, i.e., at the time of 
the riots. For the borough level data the minimum comes from Kingston upon Thames, 
closely followed by Sutton, while the maximum is from Westminster in August 2011. 
(TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE.) 
I again use difference-in-differences estimators with the measures of police deployment (both 
in levels and as logs) as dependent variables. Due to the low number of cross-sectional units 
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in both the ward and the borough level dataset, I do not distinguish between directly and 
indirectly affected areas, but rather consider a ward/borough to be treated as soon as one riot-
related event occurred in it. This is the case for 28% of all wards and 72% of all boroughs.  
(TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE.) 
Estimation results can be found in table 9. As we can see during August 2011, i.e., during the 
riots, all areas experienced a large increase in both measures of police deployment, which 
was even larger in the affected areas. Subsequently differences between affected and 
unaffected regions become smaller and statistically insignificant. One should note, however, 
that point estimates are always positive, which might be a hint of some re-deployment of 
police after the riots. More importantly, the point estimates suggest relatively small effects in 
terms of their size. Their pattern also does not fit the pattern of the changes in crime rates in 
table 3: During the months when we observe the strongest declines in crime, we do not 
observe any increase in police deployment. In fact, if anything the data rather suggests a 
decrease in deployment. In other words, it seems unlikely that the decreases in crime after the 
riots were caused by massive increases in police presence in the affected areas. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper investigated the consequences of the 2011 London riots for crime rates, 
unemployment and policing in the affected areas. The main results indicate that crime in the 
affected areas fell substantially in the months following the riots. In total, the estimates 
suggest that affected areas experienced around 5500 fewer crimes and around 7200 fewer 
acts of anti-social behaviour than expected without the riots. I also provided estimates on two 
possible channels through which the riots might influence future crime rates, specifically 
changes in economic conditions and changes in policing. My estimates suggest that 
unemployment in the affected areas increased relative to other parts of London. At the same 
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time there does not seem to be an increase in police strength in the affected areas. None of 
these factors seems likely to be able to explain the observed drop in crime, however.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, main sample 
Variable Mean Std.dev Min Max 
Directly affected postcodes 
All crime (excl. ASB) 0.529 2.584 0 216 
Non-violent crime 0.431 2.286 0 216 
Burglary 0.052 0.294 0 15 
Robbery 0.028 0.215 0 10 
Violent crime 0.098 0.488 0 22 
Anti-social behaviour 0.266 1.548 0 159 
Observations 211,440 
Indirectly affected postcodes 
All crime (excl. ASB) 0.516 3.668 0 431 
Non-violent crime 0.427 3.269 0 401 
Burglary 0.053 0.318 0 24 
Robbery 0.025 0.211 0 19 
Violent crime 0.089 0.559 0 49 
Anti-social behaviour 0.243 1.564 0 104 
Observations 513,760 
Unaffected postcodes 
All crime (excl. ASB) 0.264 1.314 0 199 
Non-violent crime 0.215 1.147 0 188 
Burglary 0.035 0.226 0 21 
Robbery 0.012 0.135 0 13 
Violent crime 0.049 0.320 0 27 
Anti-social behaviour 0.141 0.975 0 155 
Observations 2,586,960 
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Table 2: Pseudo-interventions, sample from December 2010 to July 2011 
 Total 
crime 
Non-violent 
Crime 
Violent 
Crime 
Anti-social 
behaviour 
 Pseudo-intervention 1: “riots” in February 2011 
Post-treatment 0.0253*** 0.0215*** 0.0038*** 0.0174*** 
(0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0005) (0.0015) 
Directly affected * Post-
treatment  
0.0093 0.0043 0.0050* 0.0105 
(0.0100) (0.0094) (0.0029) (0.0071) 
Indirectly affected * Post-
treatment  
0.0219*** 0.0213*** 0.0006 0.0007 
(0.0066) (0.0064) (0.0017) (0.0051) 
 Pseudo-intervention 2: “riots” in May 2011 
Post-treatment 0.0271*** 0.0230*** 0.0042*** 0.0197*** 
(0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0006) (0.0015) 
Directly affected * Post-
treatment  
0.0107 0.0074 0.0033 0.0091 
(0.0111) (0.0103) (0.0030) (0.0069) 
Indirectly affected * Post-
treatment  
0.0280*** 0.0255*** 0.0025 0.0140*** 
(0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0018) (0.0046) 
Observations 1,449,070 
Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the level of 
the postcode sector level. All estimates contain fixed effects for 8-digit postcodes. ***/**/* denote 
statistical significance on the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 3: Crime estimates, main results 
 All crime Non-violent 
Crime 
Violent 
Crime 
Anti-social 
behaviour 
August 2011 (riots) -0.0045** -0.0042** -0.0003 0.0233*** 
(0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0007) (0.0022) 
September 2011 (riots + 1 month) -0.0205*** -0.0135*** -0.0071*** -0.0309*** 
(0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0007) (0.0017) 
Oct. – Dec. 2011(riots + 1 quarter) -0.0066*** 0.0009 -0.0075*** -0.0316*** 
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0005) (0.0015) 
Jan. – Mar. 2012 (riots + 2 quarters) -0.0196*** -0.0092*** -0.0103*** -0.0433*** 
(0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0006) (0.0019) 
Directly affected * August 2011 0.0455*** 0.0434*** 0.0021 0.0200** 
(0.0157) (0.0137) (0.0045) (0.0094) 
Directly affected * September 2011 -0.0131 -0.0029 -0.0102*** -0.0228*** 
(0.0192) (0.0188) (0.0039) (0.0082) 
Directly affected * Oct. – Dec. 2011 -0.0033 -0.0002 -0.0031 -0.0161** 
(0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0026) (0.0076) 
Directly affected * Jan. – Mar. 2012 -0.0198 -0.0088 -0.0110*** -0.0366*** 
(0.0125) (0.0112) (0.0029) (0.0091) 
Indirectly affected * August 2011 -0.0038 -0.0021 -0.0017 0.0199*** 
(0.0108) (0.0098) (0.0025) (0.0063) 
Indirectly affected * September 
2011 
-0.0244*** -0.0210** -0.0034* -0.0154*** 
(0.0086) (0.0082) (0.0019) (0.0056) 
Indirectly affected * Oct. – Dec. 
2011 
-0.0133*** -0.0085* -0.0048*** -0.0161*** 
(0.0050) (0.0044) (0.0016) (0.0047) 
Indirectly affected * Jan. – Mar. 
2012 
-0.0311*** -0.0217*** -0.0094*** -0.0291*** 
(0.0085) (0.0073) (0.0023) (0.0059) 
Observations 3,312,160 
Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the level of 
the postcode sector level. All estimates contain fixed effects for 8-digit postcodes. ***/**/* denote 
statistical significance on the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
  
 25 
Table 4: Implied changes in crime numbers  
 
Sep. 
2011 
Oct. – Dec. 
2011 
Jan. – Mar. 
2012 
Total Sep. 2011 to Mar. 
2012 
Directly affected postcodes, N=13,215 
Total crime 0 0 0 0 
Non-violent crime 0 0 0 0 
Violent crime -136.1 0 -436.1 -572.2 
Anti-social 
behaviour -301.3 -638.3 -1451.0 -2390.6 
Indirectly affected postcodes, N=32,110 
Total crime -783.5 -1281.2 -2995.9 -5060.6 
Non-violent crime -674.3 -818.8 -2032.6 -3525.7 
Violent crime -109.2 -462.4 -905.5 -1477.1 
Anti-social 
behaviour -494.5 -1550.9 -2803.2 -4848.6 
All calculations are based on the estimates in table 3.  
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Table 5: Crime estimates, only postcode areas with affected postcodes 
 All crime Non-violent 
Crime 
Violent 
Crime 
Anti-social 
behaviour 
August 2011 (riots) -0.0041 -0.0041* 0.0000 0.0287*** 
(0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0009) (0.0033) 
September 2011 (riots + 1 month) -0.0269*** -0.0187*** -0.0083*** -0.0361*** 
(0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0009) (0.0023) 
Oct. – Dec. 2011(riots + 1 quarter) -0.0088*** 0.0002 -0.0091*** -0.0361*** 
(0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0007) (0.0021) 
Jan. – Mar. 2012 (riots + 2 quarters) -0.0235*** -0.0118*** -0.0117*** -0.0505*** 
(0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0008) (0.0026) 
Directly affected * August 2011 0.0451*** 0.0433*** 0.0018 0.0147 
(0.0158) (0.0138) (0.0045) (0.0097) 
Directly affected * September 2011 -0.0067 0.0023 -0.0090** -0.0176** 
(0.0192) (0.0189) (0.0039) (0.0083) 
Directly affected * Oct. – Dec. 2011 -0.0010 0.0005 -0.0016 -0.0116 
(0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0027) (0.0078) 
Directly affected * Jan. – Mar. 2012 -0.0159 -0.0062 -0.0096*** -0.0294*** 
(0.0126) (0.0113) (0.0029) (0.0093) 
Indirectly affected * August 2011 -0.0043 -0.0023 -0.0020 0.0145** 
(0.0109) (0.0099) (0.0025) (0.0067) 
Indirectly affected * September 
2011 
-0.0180** -0.0158* -0.0022 -0.0102* 
(0.0088) (0.0083) (0.0020) (0.0058) 
Indirectly affected * Oct. – Dec. 
2011 
-0.0110** -0.0078* -0.0032* -0.0116** 
(0.0052) (0.0046) (0.0017) (0.0049) 
Indirectly affected * Jan. – Mar. 
2012 
-0.0272*** -0.0191** -0.0080*** -0.0219*** 
(0.0087) (0.0075) (0.0023) (0.0062) 
Observations 2,357,792 
Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the level of 
the postcode sector level. All estimates contain fixed effects for 8-digit postcodes. ***/**/* denote 
statistical significance on the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics, unemployment sample 
Variable Mean Std.dev Min Max 
All JSA claimants 44.66 29.44 0 260 
JSA claimants younger than 18 0.00 0.14 0 10 
JSA claimants younger than 25 9.78 8.72 0 125 
JSA claimants for more than 1 year 7.94 8.06 0 80 
JSA claimants for more than 6 months 17.50 14.58 0 145 
Directly affected 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Indirectly affected 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Observations 89,296 
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Table 7: Unemployment estimates, LSOA level regressions 
 All JSA 
claimants 
JSA claimants 
younger than 
18 
JSA claimants 
younger than 
25 
JSA claimants 
for more than 
1 year 
JSA claimants 
for more than 
6 months 
August 2011 
(riots) 
2.1494*** 0.0044* 1.5107*** 0.1741*** 1.8294*** 
(0.0766) (0.0024) (0.0520) (0.0341) (0.0542) 
September 
2011 (riots + 1 
month) 
2.5293*** 0.0005 1.8687*** 0.5483*** 2.6043*** 
(0.0822) (0.0018) (0.0555) (0.0377) (0.0628) 
Oct. – Dec. 
2011(riots + 1 
quarter) 
2.0815*** -0.0004 1.3957*** 1.3322*** 3.3737*** 
(0.0801) (0.0015) (0.0484) (0.0403) (0.0674) 
Jan. – Mar. 
2012 (riots + 2 
quarters) 
2.6634*** -0.0019 1.1584*** 2.7595*** 4.6924*** 
(0.0899) (0.0013) (0.0522) (0.0528) (0.0799) 
Directly 
affected * 
August 2011 
1.2544** -0.0024* 0.5518 -0.1334 0.5115 
(0.5456) (0.0013) (0.3498) (0.2343) (0.4046) 
Directly 
affected * 
September 
2011 
0.9444 -0.0003 0.5417 -0.0045 0.7802* 
(0.6165) (0.0010) (0.3726) (0.2457) (0.4499) 
Directly 
affected * Oct. 
– Dec. 2011 
0.3735 0.0002 0.1025 0.1094 1.3697*** 
(0.6071) (0.0008) (0.3289) (0.2727) (0.4636) 
Directly 
affected * Jan. 
– Mar. 2012 
-0.0826 0.0010 0.1596 0.7379** 1.6008*** 
(0.6876) (0.0007) (0.3381) (0.3385) (0.5856) 
Indirectly 
affected * 
August 2011 
1.2227*** -0.0038* -0.4270* 0.1015 0.8367*** 
(0.3654) (0.0021) (0.2324) (0.1617) (0.2686) 
Indirectly 
affected * 
September 
2011 
1.4254*** -0.0005 -0.0183 0.1427 1.3201*** 
(0.3762) (0.0016) (0.2321) (0.1682) (0.2951) 
Indirectly 
affected * Oct. 
– Dec. 2011 
1.5248*** 0.0004 0.0327 0.5475*** 1.6220*** 
(0.3799) (0.0013) (0.2097) (0.1838) (0.3246) 
Indirectly 
affected * Jan. 
– Mar. 2012 
1.4617*** 0.0016 0.2008 1.1245*** 2.2870*** 
(0.4226) (0.0011) (0.2240) (0.2458) (0.3991) 
Observations 89,296 
Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the level of 
the LSOA level. All estimates contain fixed effects for 8-digit postcodes. ***/**/* denote statistical 
significance on the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics, police deployment sample 
Variable Mean Std.dev Min Max 
 Ward level data 
Hours on duty by safer neighbourhood team officers 944.7 338.9 7 5,079 
Affected 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Observations 9,641 
 Borough level data 
Potential hours on patrol 62359.6 21576.0 32,446 179,088 
Affected 0.72 0.45 0 1 
Observations 512 
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Table 9: Riots and police force deployment 
 Hours on duty by safer neighbourhood 
team officers 
Potential hours on patrol 
 (Ward level) (Borough level) 
 Levels Logs Levels Logs 
August 2011 
(riots) 
180.1663*** 0.1817*** 11564.5679*** 0.1922*** 
(10.3693) (0.0098) (2031.6135) (0.0271) 
September 2011 
(riots + 1 month) 
22.9151*** 0.0334*** -674.4321 -0.0099 
(7.5441) (0.0089) (1552.5541) (0.0271) 
Oct. – Dec. 
2011(riots + 1 
quarter) 
0.3710 -0.0058 -1205.7654 -0.0242 
(7.6627) (0.0110) (1033.9306) (0.0183) 
Jan. – Mar. 2012 
(riots + 2 
quarters) 
-26.8971*** -0.0389*** -3052.3765*** -0.0602*** 
(8.3741) (0.0129) (1016.6820) (0.0186) 
Affected * August 
2011 
48.5674** 0.0500** 5454.2534** 0.0470 
(20.9342) (0.0194) (2364.5057) (0.0315) 
Affected * 
September 2011 
2.3874 0.0064 2239.8621 0.0388 
(15.6195) (0.0168) (1633.9447) (0.0285) 
Affected * Oct. – 
Dec. 2011 
1.8058 0.0143 1074.1229 0.0255 
(15.4283) (0.0182) (1163.4190) (0.0198) 
Affected * Jan. – 
Mar. 2012 
18.1786 0.0396* 1385.1978 0.0418* 
(15.9843) (0.0206) (1390.7987) (0.0208) 
Observations 9641 512 
Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the ward 
and borough level respectively. All estimates contain fixed effects for wards and boroughs 
respectively. ***/**/* denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Figure 1: Crime over time and by treatment/control group 
Panel (a): Total crime 
 
Panel (b): Non-violent crime 
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Panel (c): Violent crime 
 
Panel (d): Anti-social behaviour 
 
 
